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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-2319 
_____________ 
 
JOE GARCIA; FERNANDO QUILES; DALIA RIVERA MATIAS,  
                                        Appellants 
 
v. 
 
2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMMISSION;  
SECRETARY COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,  
As Chief Election Officer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00556) 
District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2014 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 17, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 In this lawsuit, three Pennsylvania voters challenge the districting plan used by the 
Commonwealth in the 2012 election for Pennsylvania Senate.  That plan had been 
 2 
promulgated in 2001 based on population data from the 2000 U.S. census.  The voters, 
plaintiffs before the District Court and appellants before us, contend that, by 2012, the 
Senate districts drawn in 2001 had become severely malapportioned in light of 
intervening population shifts and that use of the outdated districting map in the 2012 
election violated the Equal Protection Clause’s one person, one vote principle.1  They 
sought an injunction in the District Court shortening the four-year term of all senators 
elected in 2012 and ordering that a special election be held to fill their seats.  They also 
asked that a three-judge panel of the district court be assembled to adjudicate their claim.  
The Court rejected the requested relief and granted defendants’ motions to dismiss.  We 
will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Pennsylvania’s 2011-2012 Legislative Reapportionment Process 
 The Pennsylvania Constitution requires reapportionment of the Commonwealth’s 
General Assembly districts once every ten years, following each federal decennial 
census.  Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(a).  After each census, a Legislative Reapportionment 
Commission (“LRC”) is constituted to divide Pennsylvania into 50 senatorial and 203 
representative districts.  The LRC is required to file a preliminary reapportionment plan 
and then provide an opportunity for public comment and its own revision of the initial 
plan before adopting a final version.  Once the LRC’s plan becomes final, any aggrieved 
                                                 
 
1
 Before the District Court, plaintiffs also argued that use of the 2001 plan in the 
2012 election resulted in the unconstitutional malapportionment of Pennsylvania House 
of Representatives districts and unlawfully diluted the votes of Latino voters in violation 
of the Voting Rights Act.  They do not pursue these claims on appeal. 
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person may file an appeal directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which has final 
approval authority.  After the Supreme Court has denied any outstanding appeals or the 
last day for filing an appeal has passed with no appeal taken, the final reapportionment 
plan “shall have the force of law and the districts therein provided shall be used thereafter 
in elections to the General Assembly until the next [constitutionally required] 
reapportionment.”  Id. § 17(e). 
 On December 21, 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau reported national and state 
population counts from the 2010 federal census, triggering the start of Pennsylvania’s 
reapportionment process.  The LRC was fully assembled in April 2011, and filed its 
preliminary reapportionment plan on October 31, 2011.  After entertaining comments and 
objections from members of the public and making its own technical corrections to the 
preliminary plan, the LRC approved a final plan (the “2011 Final Plan”) at a public 
administrative meeting on December 12, 2011. 
 Twelve petitions challenging the 2011 Final Plan were filed with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.  On January 25, 2012, following expedited briefing and oral argument, 
the Supreme Court issued an order declaring that the 2011 Final Plan was “contrary to 
law” and remanding the plan to the LRC with instructions to reapportion the 
Commonwealth.  Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711, 715-
16 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam order).  The Court’s order stated that the 2001 plan adopted 
after the 2000 U.S. census would  “remain in effect until a revised final 2011 Legislative 
Reapportionment Plan having the force of law is approved.”  Id. at 716. 
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 The LRC issued a revised plan on April 12, 2012, and, after timely exceptions 
were filed, adopted its revised plan as final on June 8, 2012 (the “2012 Final Plan”).  
Thirteen appeals challenging the 2012 Final Plan were lodged with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.  On May 8, 2013, the Supreme Court approved the 2012 Final Plan, 
giving it “the force of law.”2  Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 67 
A.3d 1211, 1242-43 (Pa. 2013) (“Holt II”); see Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(e). 
B. The 2012 Senate Election 
 Meanwhile, as the LRC worked to create a new reapportionment plan in the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s remand, the 2012 elections for General Assembly, the first to take 
place after the release of the 2010 U.S. census results, proceeded under the 2001 plan.  
Elections for Pennsylvania Senate occur each even-numbered year, with senators elected 
to serve staggered four-year terms.  Each cycle, half of the Senate stands for election.  In 
2012, voters in odd-numbered districts elected senators to terms commencing 
December 1, 2012.  Senatorial seats assigned to even-numbered districts were previously 
filled in 2010 under the 2001 plan.  Even-numbered seats will next be filled in 2014 in 
accordance with the 2012 Final Plan and those elected will serve four-year terms 
beginning December 1, 2014. 
C. The Appellants’ Suit 
 Appellants are three registered Pennsylvania voters who challenge the use of the 
2001 reapportionment plan in the 2012 Senate elections.  According to the 2010 
                                                 
 
2
 Appellants do not challenge the constitutionality of the 2012 Final Plan. 
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decennial census, Pennsylvania’s population had increased to 12,702,379, meaning that, 
to achieve equally populated senatorial districts, each of the 50 districts should contain 
approximately 254,048 individuals.  Continued use of district boundaries drawn in 2001 
meant that, as of 2012, certain Senate districts deviated markedly from this target 
population.  Consequently, voters in more-populated districts were underrepresented in 
the Senate and the effectiveness of any votes cast by these individuals in the 2012 Senate 
election were, comparatively, worth less than the votes cast by individuals in less-
populated districts.  Appellants, all of whom reside in overpopulated districts, contend 
that this level of deviation in district size amounts to unconstitutional malapportionment 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  They also 
argue that the LRC unduly delayed issuing a preliminary reapportionment plan, ensuring 
that the 2012 election would be held under the old apportionment scheme.   
 Although appellants challenge the manner in which the 2012 senatorial election 
was conducted, all three of them are residents of even-numbered districts and, therefore, 
could not have voted in that election, in which only senators from odd-numbered districts 
were selected.  Two of the appellants live in Philadelphia, located in Pennsylvania’s 2nd 
Senatorial District, and the third lives in Allentown, located in the 16th Senatorial 
District. 
 Appellants filed their complaint on February 2, 2012, naming the LRC and 
Secretary of the Commonwealth Carol Aichele as defendants.  That June, appellants filed 
a motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting (1) a shortened term for any 
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Pennsylvania legislator elected in 2012 pursuant to the 2001 reapportionment plan and 
(2) a special election for their seats to be held in accordance with a new reapportionment 
plan.  Appellants also requested that a three-judge panel of the district court be convened 
to adjudicate their claims.  The LRC and the Secretary filed motions to dismiss. 
 On April 5, 2013, the District Court, sitting as a single judge, concluded that use 
of the 2001 reapportionment plan in the 2012 elections, while the process of approving a 
new plan was ongoing, did not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.  Finding 
appellants’ constitutional claim “insubstantial,” the Court denied the motion for a 
preliminary injunction and granted the motions to dismiss without convening a three-
judge panel.  (App. at 23.) 
 Appellants appeal the District Court’s decision not to appoint a three-judge panel, 
its denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction, and its grant of the Secretary’s 
motion to dismiss.
3
 
II. JURISDICTIONAL BASIS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The statutory basis for the District Court’s jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343, and our jurisdiction, if constitutionally proper, arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision not to convene a 
three-judge panel.  Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 192 n.11 (3d Cir. 2001).  According to 
                                                 
 
3
 The LRC was initially an appellee in this case.  After the notice of appeal was 
filed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its decision in Holt II approving the LRC’s 
2012 Final Plan.  According to appellants, that decision mooted any relief they sought 
from the LRC, and, pursuant to a stipulation, we subsequently dismissed the LRC as a 
party to this appeal. 
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28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), in general, a three-judge panel of the district court must be 
convened “when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of . . . the 
apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”  In such a suit, a single district court 
judge is not permitted to “hear and determine any application for a preliminary or 
permanent injunction . . . or enter judgment on the merits.”  Id. § 2284(b)(3).  A panel of 
three judges need not be assembled, however, and a single judge of the district court may 
issue a ruling on the merits where “the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge was legally 
frivolous and insubstantial.”  Page, 248 F.3d at 191 (citing Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 
512, 518 (1973); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962) (per curiam)). 
 It is also necessary for us to consider appellants’ standing to bring their 
malapportionment claim, an issue not addressed by the District Court.  Before any federal 
appellate court can examine the merits of a claim, it must be satisfied that both it has and 
the lower court had subject matter jurisdiction.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 
(1986).  A court has this “independent obligation to determine whether subject matter 
jurisdiction exists, even if its jurisdiction is not challenged.”  Nuveen Mun. Trust ex rel. 
Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 293 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).  Proper 
jurisdiction exists only where the dispute constitutes a “case” or “controversy” within the 
meaning of Article III, which, in turn, requires that the plaintiffs have standing to sue.  
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).  The burden of establishing standing belongs 
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to the plaintiff.  Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 Jurisdiction may be called into question, as we do here, based on the insufficiency 
of the allegations in a complaint.  In such a case, we must accept the allegations of the 
complaint as true and determine whether they are sufficient to invoke federal-court 
jurisdiction.  Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 After receiving briefing on the merits of appellants’ malapportionment claim, 
which appeared to be based on an alleged dilution of their votes in the 2012 Pennsylvania 
Senate election, we sua sponte directed the parties to provide supplemental memoranda 
addressing whether they have standing to bring such a claim, given that they are residents 
of even-numbered districts and were not eligible to vote in the 2012 election.  Our 
concerns regarding standing were warranted.  We find that appellants lack standing to 
pursue a claim of vote dilution with respect to the 2012 senatorial election.  Even if, 
however, their malapportionment claim is based on ongoing underrepresentation in the 
Pennsylvania Senate, an injury sufficient to establish standing, and not the debasement of 
votes cast in a specific election, the District Court appropriately dismissed that claim. 
A. Constitutional Apportionment Standard 
 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause obliges the states to count 
equally the votes of its citizens.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-64 (1964).  
Accordingly, state legislative districts must be as equal in population as is practicable, 
thereby ensuring substantially equal representation for all citizens and substantially 
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equally weighted votes in legislative elections.  As a corollary to this mandate, “an 
individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its 
weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living [in] 
other parts of the State.”  Id. at 568. 
 Of course, the Supreme Court has recognized that strict adherence to a one person, 
one vote rule in the context of state districting is neither possible nor, in all instances, 
desirable.  Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 
735, 743-49 (1973).  And the Constitution does not inflexibly require states to redraw 
constantly their legislative districts in order to maintain even populations in the face of 
ever-changing demographics.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84.  Instead, states may enact “a 
reasonably conceived plan for periodic readjustment of legislative representation.”  Id. at 
583.  The Supreme Court in Reynolds made clear that compliance with a decennial 
reapportionment scheme is sufficient to pass constitutional muster but less frequent 
apportionment “would assuredly be constitutionally suspect.”  Id. at 583-84. 
B. Standing in Apportionment Cases 
 To demonstrate constitutional standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an “injury in 
fact” that is (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual and imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) that the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant”; and (3) that it is “likely,” rather than speculative, “that a 
favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.”  Summers v. Earth Island 
Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (quotation marks omitted); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
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Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). 
 These requirements, including the need to demonstrate “injury in fact,” are no less 
applicable in the apportionment context.  Although all those in a covered district are 
impacted by malapportionment, not everyone is injured.  Indeed, as Reynolds makes 
plain, the detrimental effect of malapportionment is not simply a generalized harm to the 
polity.  Malapportionment’s harm is felt by individuals in overpopulated districts who 
actually suffer a diminution in the efficacy of their votes and their proportional voice in 
the legislature.  See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-63 (framing uneven districting as a 
form of “invidious discrimination” based on geographic location that abridges the voting 
rights of individuals in “disfavored areas,” because “[o]verweighting and overvaluation 
of the votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of 
the votes of those living there”). 
 To challenge a state’s apportionment scheme, therefore, an individual must belong 
to the injured class of people whose votes and representational voice receive less than 
their fair share.  See Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 603-04 (5th Cir. 1974) (relying 
on the Supreme Court’s holding in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206-08 (1962), that 
underrepresentation in a plan of apportionment is an injury sufficient to confer standing); 
accord Wright v. Dougherty Cnty., 358 F.3d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); 
League of Women Voters v. Nassau Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155, 161-62 (2d 
Cir. 1984); Skolnick v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 F.2d 361, 363-64 (7th Cir. 1970).  Moreover, 
a voter who has not been injured lacks standing to sue on behalf of individuals who are 
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actually injured by a plan of apportionment.  See Wright, 358 F.3d at 1355. 
C. Application 
 Appellants’ claim is clear: Pennsylvania’s failure to implement a new 
apportionment plan based on 2010 census data and the continued use of an outdated 
district map in the 2012 Senate election violated the constitutional principle of one 
person, one vote.  Less evident from the complaint and appellants’ briefing before us is 
exactly how they, in particular, were aggrieved by untimely reapportionment.  
Appellants’ reply brief supplies the clearest articulation of their claim.  There, they 
several times assert that the delay in adoption of a new apportionment plan abridged their 
“right to participate” in an election “on an equal basis with other citizens.”  Appellants’ 
Reply Br. at 1, 5-7 & n.1.  In essence, appellants contend that they were denied the ability 
to cast a vote of equal weight in the 2012 election because they lived in overpopulated, 
but identically represented, districts. 
 Given Pennsylvania’s staggered method of electing senators, however, no 
appellant could have voted for senator in the 2012 election, as they all reside in even-
numbered districts.  Only voters in odd-numbered districts selected senators in 2012.  
Thus, appellants cannot argue that they were injured in fact through unfair dilution of 
their votes in 2012, the salient factor in the courts of appeals’ cases building on Baker’s 
standing analysis.  See, e.g., Wright, 358 F.3d at 1355; League of Women Voters, 737 
F.2d at 161-62. 
 Nor, for that matter, do appellants explain how enactment of a new apportionment 
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plan prior to the 2012 election would have safeguarded their right to cast an undiluted 
ballot, such that an equal protection claim is traceable to the LRC’s delay.  They do not 
contend, for instance, that, if the 2012 Final Plan or some other plan had been 
implemented before the 2012 election, they would have been moved into a well-
apportioned, odd-numbered district and been able to vote for a senator in that election.  
Appellants, therefore, lack standing to bring a claim of unconstitutional vote dilution with 
respect to the 2012 senatorial election, and any claim founded on this basis is “legally 
frivolous and insubstantial.”  Page, 248 F.3d at 191. 
 In their supplemental briefing, and in response to our expressed concern as to 
standing, appellants press a modified vision of their claim.  They argue that 
Pennsylvania’s failure to reapportion its Senate districts within ten years of the 2001 
apportionment relegated them to overpopulated districts in violation of their 
constitutional right to representational equality.  According to appellants, because the 
2012 election was conducted pursuant to an outdated district map, it perpetuated unequal 
and, with respect to them, diluted Senate representation beyond the ten-year timeframe 
for reapportionment discussed in Reynolds. 
 We need not decide the ultimate merits of such an equal protection claim.  Federal 
courts must exercise caution before inserting themselves into a state’s districting process, 
as it is a political matter primarily within the authority of the states themselves.  Cf. 
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993) (directing federal courts to defer their 
consideration of apportionment disputes to permit redistricting by state legislatures and 
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courts); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 749-50 (warning federal courts against modifying state 
apportionment plans that contain modest deviations in district populations).  Courts must 
also take stock of general equitable principles, “the circumstances of the challenged 
apportionment[,] and a variety of local conditions” in attempting to redress any injury 
wrought by malapportionment.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585. 
 Here, even assuming that Pennsylvania’s delayed apportionment runs afoul of 
constitutional standards, there is ample reason for us to decline to venture into the 
Commonwealth’s redistricting process.  Appellants stress their need for an injunction 
ordering that senators elected in 2012 serve a shortened two-year term and that a special 
election, coinciding with the regularly scheduled 2014 Senate election, be held to fill 
odd-numbered Senate seats.  But that will not remedy their alleged injury of continued 
representational inequality.  Regardless of whether the senators in odd-numbered districts 
stand for special election in 2014, the 2014 election for even-numbered districts will be 
conducted in accordance with the new electoral map (the 2012 Final Plan, which 
appellants do not challenge) and, in fact, by 2014, it appears that all senators will be 
assigned to represent redrawn and equally sized districts under that plan, which now has 
“the force of law.”  Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(e).  In other words, even without intervention 
by the federal courts, by 2014, appellants will be placed in evenly apportioned districts 
and enjoy equal representation.  Because the remedy they seek will do nothing to 
effectuate more speedily their rights, we will affirm the District Court’s order of 
dismissal. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court declining 
to refer this matter to a three-judge panel, denying appellants’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction, and granting Secretary Aichele’s motion to dismiss. 
 
 
